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Abstract—In this paper, we characterize the revision sets in
different variants of the best response algorithm that guarantee
convergence to pure Nash Equilibria in potential games. We prove
that if the revision protocol is separable (to be defined in the
paper), then the greedy version as well as smoothed versions of
the algorithm converge to pure Nash equilibria. If the revision
protocol is not separable, then convergence to Nash Equilibria
may fail in both cases. For smoothed best response, we further
show convergence to Nash Equilibria with optimal potential when
players can only play one by one. Again this may fail as soon
as simultaneous play is allowed, unless the number of players is
two. We also provide several examples/counter-examples testing
the domain of validity of these results.
Keywords—Potential Games; Best Response; Logit Dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Potential games have been introduced in [1] and have proven
very usefuf, especially in the context of routing games, first
mentioned in [2] and exhaustively studied ever since, in the
transportation as well as computer science litterature, see for
example [3]–[5] and for distributed optimization (see for exam-
ple [6]).
While it is well-known that the Best Response Algorithm
(BRA) converges to pure Nash equilibria (NE) in potential
games [7], the robustness of this result w.r.t. the underlying
assumptions has attracted surprisingly little attention.
In this paper we investigate the following question: under
which revision protocol does BRA converge to NE? The clas-
sical BRA assumes that the revision protocol is asynchronous:
At each round, a single player is given a chance to revise its
strategy.
It can be shown (see Section II) that violating this as-
sumption and allowing for simultaneous revision protocols
can compromize the convergence to any Nash Equilibrium.
So why should one consider simultaneous revisions anyway?
Because such revisions may happen in practical cases. Indeed,
partially simultaneous revisions can be implemented in a fully
distributed way (for example, each player decides to play (or
not) at each round, independently of the others). On the other
hand, an asynchronous revision requires a central controller,
or an election protocol between the players, to select the next
player to play. In practical cases, this is either cumbersome or
even impossible when the game involves many players with no
coordination mechanism between them.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we give
a necessary and sufficient condition on the revision protocol to
converge to NE in all potential games. This condition is a struc-
tural condition on the support of the revision law. It is rather
easy to check and can be enforced in fully distributed games. We
also provide a game-dependent version of this condition that is
based on the neighboring graph between players induced by the
game. This also guarantees convergence to a Nash equilibrium
of the game. Section IV extends our result to a smoothed version
of BRA, that provides, in contrast with BRA, a guarantee of
convergence to one Nash Equilibrium with maximal potential
for special cases of separable revision laws (more precisely
when players can only play one by one). In the last section (§V),
several examples show that the conditions given in the theorems
cannot be improved.
II. POTENTIAL GAMES, BEST RESPONSE ALGORITHM
AND THE REVISION PROTOCOL
We consider a finite game G def= (N ,A, u) consisting of
• a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , N};
• a finite set Ak of actions (or pure strategies) for each
player k ∈ N ; The set of (action) profiles or states of
the game is A def= ∏kAk;
• the players’ payoff functions uk : A → R that players
seek to maximize.
We define the classical best response correspondence
BRk(x) as the set of all actions that maximizes the payoff for
player k under profile x:
BRk(x)
def
=
{
argmax
α∈Ak
uk(α;x−k)
}
. (1)
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a fixed point of the correspondence,
i.e. a profile x∗ such that x∗k ∈ BRk(x∗) for every player k.
Iteratively playing a best response may not converge in
general. We consider here the specific class of potential games
for which convergence is ensured.
Definition 1 (Potential games and its variants). A game is
an (exact) potential game [7] if it admits a function (called the
potential) F : A → R such that for any player k and any
unilateral deviation of k from action profile x to x′
uk(x)− uk(x′) = F (x)− F (x′). (2)
A game is a generalized ordinal potential game [7] (or G-
potential game for short) if there is F : A → R such that,
for any player k and any strictly profitable unilateral deviation
of k from action profile x to x′, F (x′) > F (x).
A game is a best-response potential game [8] (or BR-
potential game for short) if there is F : A → R such that for
any player k and action profile x
BRk(x) =
{
argmax
α∈Ak
F (α, x−k)
}
. (3)
As shown in [8], BR-potential games are characterized by
the fact that any sequence of profiles generated by unilateral
best response, and containing at least one strict improvement,
is not a cycle. In particular, it can be seen that exact poten-
tial games are BR-potential games, but there exist G-potential
games that are not BR-potential games. Yet, by imposing that
the best response correspondence is univaluated (our next as-
sumption), it becomes true that any G-potential game is also a
BR-potential game.
To avoid ties, and unless otherwise mentioned, we make the
following assumption in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1 (Uniqueness of Best Response). We assume
that the Best Response correspondence is a univaluated func-
tion; for any player k and profile x:
BRk(x) = argmax
α∈Ak
uk(α;x−k). (4)
For example, this assumption holds when players face dif-
ferent payoffs at each state:
uk(α, x−k) 6= uk(β, x−k), (5)
whenever α 6= β, for all k and all x. This can be imposed by
perturbing the payoffs. Also, for general payoffs, breaking ties
can be done by ranking players and actions using an arbitrary
fixed order.
As mentioned earlier, a G-potential game that satisfies this
assumption is necessarily a BR-potential game. Hence all the
results will be stated for BR-potential games in the following.
Let us now focus on the revision protocol, that is the
sequence of players that can revise their strategy . We first con-
sider a version of the asynchronous Best Response Algorithm
(asyncBRA) where the next player is selected according to a
revision protocol driven by a random process. Its probability
distribution ρ is called the revision law over the players:
∀k ∈ N , x ∈ A, P(selected player = k | profile x) = ρx(k).
We assume that the revision law is communicating meaning that
the probability of choosing any player is strictly positive over
time. Without this assumption, the algorithm may clearly not
converge to a NE in general.
Theorem 2 (asyncBRA converges to NE [7]). For any BR
or G-potential game G, Algorithm 1 converges in finite time,
almost surely, to a Nash Equilibrium of G.
Proof: This is a well known result, we only provide a
sketch of the proof.
Algorithm 1: Best Response Algorithm (asyncBRA) with
random selections
1 foreach player k ∈ K do
2 stopk := false
3 repeat
4 Pick player k ∈ N using law ρx
5 Select new action αk := BRk(x)
6 stopk := 1{αk=xk};
7 xk := αk;
8 until stop1 ∧ stop2 ∧ · · · ∧ stopN ;
Clearly, when a NE is reached, the algorithm stops when
each player have had the opportunity to revise its strategy.
Otherwise, a player has incentive to change its strategy,
which will lead to a strict improvement of the potential. By
characterization of BR-potential games, this state will never be
visited again. Since the number of states is finite, the algorithm
will reach a NE in finite time, almost surely.
Let us now consider the algorithm BRA under a general
revision protocol ρ that allows several players to change their
strategy simultaneously. In that case, the revision law ρ is a
distribution over sets of players, that, in full generality, depends
on the current profile x:
∀K ⊂ N , x ∈ A,
P(set of selected players = K | profile x) = ρx(K).
The sets whose probability is positive define the support of ρx,
denoted by S(ρx). In the following, we will assume that the
support does not depend on the profile, and that each player has
a chance to revise its strategy.
Assumption 2 (Constant support). The support of the revision
law ρ,
(i) is constant wrt the profile x (hence is just denoted S(ρ)):
∀x, y ∈ A,S(ρx) = S(ρy); (6)
(ii) covers all players:
∀x ∈ A,∪K∈S(ρx)K = N (7)
Algorithm 2: Best Response Algorithm BRA(ρ) with
general revision protocol ρ
1 foreach player k ∈ N do
2 stopk := false
3 repeat
4 Pick a set of players K ⊂ N using law ρx
5 foreach player k ∈ K simultaneously do
6 Select new action αk := BRk(x);
7 stopk := 1{αk=xk};
8 x := α;
9 until stop1 ∧ stop2 ∧ · · · ∧ stopN ;
To keep notations simple, for every set K of players, we
will denote by BRK(x) the action profile obtained by simul-
taneous best responses for each player in K, under x. Hence,
x′ = BRK(x) means that, for all k ∈ K,x′k = BRk(x) and for
all j 6∈ K, x′j = xj .
When several players move simultaneously, the potential
may not be increasing and then the convergence of BRA to a
NE of the game is not guaranteed as shown in the following
example.
Example 1 (No convergence to NE for simultaneous revi-
sion). Let us consider a 2-player 2-action (a and b) potential
game with the following (exact) potential:
F =
1\2 a b
a 0 2
b 3 1
If the revision protocol always makes the two players play
simultaneously (ρ({1, 2}) = 1) and if Algorithm 2 starts with
action profile (a, a), then, during the run, both players keep
changing their strategy simultaneously from (a, a) to (b, b) and
back, and they never reach the two NEs (a, b) and (b, a).
III. SEPARABILITY OF THE REVISION PROTOCOL
This section is dedicated to the description of a necessary
and sufficient condition on the revision protocol ρ that guar-
antees convergence to a NE for Algorithm BRA(ρ) in all BR-
potential games. It should be clear that this condition only de-
pends on the support of ρ (which sets have positive probability
under ρ) rather than on the actual values of the probabilities.
Indeed, since players are selected at each round independently
of the previous rounds, Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that any
sequence of revision sets with positive probability will occur
infinitely often regardless of the probability values.
To state a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence
to a NE, we need to introduce several definitions. A family F
of sets of player is a set cover of N if ∪K∈FK = N .
Definition 3 (Separable family). LetF be a set cover, consider
the following iterative elimination process: as long as there is a
singleton (say {k}) in F , remove player k from all sets in F .
Then, F is separable if the elimination process reduces F to
the empty set. A revision law ρ is separable if its support is
separable.
Another way to state the separability property is the fol-
lowing: F is separable if and only if there is a permutation
(k1, k2, . . . kN ) of N such that the following sets all belong to
F :
K1 = {k1},
Ki+1 = {ki+1} ∪ Li, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} (8)
where Li is any (possibly empty) set included in {k1, . . . ki}.
Yet another characterization, similar to the previous one, but
more compact, is that F contains N sets K1, . . .KN such that,
for all i,
Ki \ ∪j<iKj is a singleton. (9)
Obviously, if a family F is separable, then adding any set
to F preserves separability. It should also be clear that if F is
separable, then the family F ′, obtained by removing one player
from all the sets in F , is separable over the remaining N − 1
players.
Example 2 (Separable families and laws).
• If F contains all the singletons, {k1}, {k2}, · · · , {kN}
then F is separable.
• If the family F contains the sets
{k1}, {k1, k2}, · · · , {k1, k2, . . . , kN} then F is
separable.
• The following revision law ρ is separable: Each player
ki chooses to play independently of the others, with
some positive probability pi. This revision law is sepa-
rable because each singleton has a positive probability
to be played. For all i,
ρ({ki}) = pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) > 0.
This revision law is also fully distributed since it does
not require any coordination between players.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 (Convergence to NE for separable revisions). Let
N be a set of players and ρ be a revision law overN . Algorithm
BRA(ρ) converges a.s. to a NE for all BR-potential games G
over N if and only if ρ is separable.
Proof: We prove the sufficient and necessary conditions
separately.
a) Sufficient condition: The sufficient condition is
proved by contradiction.
Algorithm BRA(ρ) naturally induces a Markov process
over A (up to adding a self-loop transition at each NE with
probability one instead of stopping the algorithm). Let R be
the set of recurrent action profiles, i.e. profiles that are visited
infinitely often with probability one. All NE are recurrent since
the algorithm stays there when a NE is reached. We are going
to show that R is only made of NEs.
By contradiction, assume that there exists a BR-potential
game together with a separable revision law ρ for which al-
gorithm BRA(ρ) does not always converge to a NE. Let x be
one recurrent action profile that is not a NE, with the highest
potential. Starting from X0 = x, let us consider a run of
the algorithm using the sequence K1,K2,K3, . . . ,KN of sets
of players as defined in (8) (having positive probability by
separability of ρ) which generates the sequence of profiles
X1, X2, . . . , XN .
First notice that, if Xi = x for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, then play-
ers k1, . . . , kj already play a best response to x. In particular, j
cannot be equal to N since this would imply that x is a NE.
So let i be the smallest index in {1, . . . , N} such that
Xi 6= x. We have Xi = BRki(x) since all other players in
Ki already played a best response to x. This implies that the
potential strictly increases along this deviation. Since Xi is in
the same recurrent class as x and x is the recurrent non-NE
with the highest potential, we deduce that Xi is a NE. But this
contradicts the fact that x is recurrent since the algorithm will
never visit x again.
b) Necessary condition: The necessary part is proved by
induction on the number of players.
First notice that if the game has a single player, the syn-
chronous and asynchronous algorithms are identical, which
implies the convergence in one step to the unique NE.
Let us assume that any revision law that guarantees a.s.
convergence on any game with N − 1 players is separable. This
induction property is denotedP(N − 1).
We now consider a revision law ρ over a set N of players
of size N such that for any game G over N , every execution of
Algorithm BRA(ρ) converges a.s. to a NE. We will show that ρ
is separable.
We first show that the support of ρ must contain a singleton.
For that, let us construct a specific game overN with action set
Ak = {0, . . . , p − 1} for every player k, where p is a prime
number larger than N .
The payoffs are taken identical for every players and equal
to the potential F (x) = −(∑k xk mod p). The maximum of
the potential is 0, which is reached when e.g. all players choose
action 0.
The best response of any player k in a state with potential
−h is to choose action (xk − h) mod p. Therefore, when m
players play simultaneously in a state with potential −h, the
potential becomes −((h + m(−h)) mod p) = −((1 − m)h
mod p). Starting from a state with potential −1 and using a
sequence of revision sets with respective sizes m1, . . . ,m`, . . .
the successive values of the potential are:
−((1−m1) mod p),
−((1−m1)(1−m2) mod p),
...
−((1−m1)(1−m2) · · · (1−m`) mod p),
...
Since BRA(ρ) converges a.s. to a NE, this sequence reaches
value 0 in finite time. Since p is prime, the only possibility is
that there exists a revision set with size 1 in the support of ρ,
say {k}. Hence, any revision law that satisfies propertyP(N)
must contain a singleton.
We are now ready for the second step of the proof that uses
the induction assumption. We first construct a revision law ρ−k
over the set of players N \ {k} whose support is obtained
by removing k from all the revisions sets in S(ρ). Now, we
can claim that BRA(ρ−k) converges in all games with N − 1
players: Indeed, from any game G over N − 1 players, one can
construct a gameG+ overN players by adding a dummy player
(say k) with a single action that does not affect the utilities of the
other players. Since BRA(ρ) converges on all games with N
players, it converges on game G+. Since the added player does
not play any role in G+, this implies that the revision law ρ−k
converges on G. By the induction assumption,P(N − 1), ρ−k
is separable. By definition of separability, ρ is also separable.
The notion of separability is game-independent. Given a
specific game G, it is possible to define a new version of the
separability property (called G-separability in the following)
that depends on G or more precisely on the interaction of
players in G.
More formally, players k and ` do not interact in game
G = (N ,A, u) if for every profile x, functions uk(x`, x−`)
and u`(xk, x−k) are constant w.r.t. to, respectively, variables
x` and xk. In the opposite case, we say that players k and `
are neighbors. We consider the graph whose vertices are the
players, and the undirected edges are defined by the neighbor
relation. The vertices of this graph can be colored such that no
neighbors have the same color. Notice that the number of colors
is not unique, for example one can use one color per player
whatever the graph.
Definition 5 (G-separability). Let us consider that the interac-
tion graph of gameG is colored with a set C of colors. LetH be
a separable family over C. For each set C inH, consider the set
N (C) of all the players whose color is in C. The collection of
all such setsN (C) for all C inH is called aG-separable family
over N .
It should be clear that, if all players are neighbors in G,
G-separability coincides with separability, because all players
must have a different color. It is also clear that separability
impliesG-separability for all games by coloring all players with
distinct colors.
Example 3 (G-separable, but not separable family). Here
is an example of a G-separable revision family that is not
separable. Consider a game G with 4 players such that 1 is a
neighbor of 2, 2 is a neighbor of 3, and 3 is a neighbor of 4, with
no other neighboring relations. The players can be colored with
two colors, Blue for players 1 and 3 and Red for players 2 and 4.
Consider the separable revision familyH over the colors, made
of two sets, {Blue}, {Blue,Red}. Now the family F is made
of two sets {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}. By definition, F is G-separable
but it is not separable because it does not contain any singleton.
The main (straightforward) property of games where two
players (say k and `) do not interact with one another is
BR{k,`}(α) = BRk(BR`(α)) = BR`(BRk(α)). (10)
In other words, letting k and ` play simultaneously or one after
the other leads to the same state.
Corollary 6 (G-separability implies convergence to NE). Let
G be a BR-potential game with N players and let ρ be G-
separable. Then BRA(ρ) converges to a NE of the game.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.
Let us assume that there is a set of recurrent profiles R that
does not contain any NE. Let x be a strategy with the largest
potential in R. Starting from x, let us consider a trajectory of
the algorithm using the sequence K1,K2, . . . ,Km of revision
sets, ordered according to (8) for the associated separable family
over the colors. The first time that the action profile becomes
different from x (to a new profile y), the potential increases
because of the order chosen on the sets. Since x is the non NE
state with the largest potential in R, then y 6∈ R unless it is a
NE. Since x is recurrent, y cannot be a NE. And y ∈ R because
there is a path coming from the recurrent state x.
Therefore, applying the sequence of revision sets
K1, . . . ,Km starting in x, the algorithm remains in x.
This implies that xk = BRk(x) for all players k ∈ N , so x is a
NE of the game.
By contradiction, this implies convergence to NE of Algo-
rithm 2.
IV. EXTENSION TO SMOOTHED BEST RESPONSE
Theorem 4 says that Algorithm BRA(ρ) converges to a NE
in potential games under the separability condition. This implies
convergence to a local minimum of the potential. However its
potential can be arbitrarily far from the global maximum.
To ensure convergence to an optimal NE (maximizing the
potential), one can replace the greedy best response (used so far)
by a smoothed best response allowing the algorithm to escape
from local maxima.
We denote by uk(x−k) the payoff vector of player k under
action profile x: uk(x−k) = (uk(α, x−k))α∈Ak .
A random choice Q is a random variable over Ak, the
actions of player k whose law only depends on the payoff vector
uk(x−k). This random choice is used to modify algorithm
BRA(ρ) in the following way.
Algorithm 3: Smoothed BR algorithm with revision law
ρ and random choice Q, SmoothBRA(ρ,Q)
1 repeat
2 Pick a set of players K ⊂ N according to ρx;
3 foreach player k ∈ K simultaneously do
4 Select action αk := Q(uk(x−k));
5 x := α;
6 until infinity;
Due to its random nature, and unlike BRA(ρ), this algorithm
never ends. Its convergence properties will only be given in
terms of its asymptotic distribution1.
In the following, we will focus on the classical logit choice,
parametrized by the temperature 1/θ. For each player k and
profile x, the law is given by:
P [Q(uk(x−k)) = α] =
exp(θuk(α, x−k))∑
β∈A(k) exp(θuk(β, x−k))
.
Note that the logit choice is a close approximation of the BR
mapping when θ goes to infinity.
Under this random choice, the sequence (Xn)n∈N of action
profiles computed by SmoothBRA(ρ,Q) forms a Markov chain
whose transition matrix can be constructed as follows.
Let Diff(x, y) def= {k : xk 6= yk} be the set of players that
must have played if the sequence (Xn)n∈N jumps fromXn = x
to Xn+1 = y in one step. Of course, the set of players that
actually played can be larger because some of them may have
1For practical purpose, one needs to stop SmoothBRA(ρ,Q) after a finite
number of iterations. Many heuristic stopping rules have been proposed (see [9]
for example), but in practice there is a fair amount of “black magic” involved
and no single stopping rule provides guarantees in the general case.
chosen to not change their action. This is the reason why we
introduce the intermediate matrix PV , defined for all sets V of
players by:
PVx,y =

∏
k∈V
exp(θuk(yk, x−k))∑
α∈A(k) exp(θuk(α, x−k))
if Diff(x, y) ⊆ V
0 otherwise.
(11)
Then the transition matrix P is
Px,y =
∑
V⊇Diff(x,y)
ρx(V )P
V
x,y.
The asymptotic behavior of algorithm SmoothBRA(ρ,Q) is
given by the stationary distribution pi of this ergodic Markov
chain on A.
The well-known Markov chain tree theorem provides an
explicit formula for pi (up to a multiplicative factor), based on
spanning trees over the Markov chain transition graph.
Theorem 7 (Markov Chain Tree Theorem [10]). Let Tx be
the set of spanning in-trees of the transition graph, with root in
x. The stationary probability pix is proportional to the sum of
the probability weights of all the spanning trees T in Tx:
pix ∝
∑
T∈Tx
∏
(y,z)∈T
Py,z.
The stationary distribution pi puts a positive probability on
all action profiles x, meaning that all action profiles will be vis-
ited infinitely often during the execution of SmoothBRA(ρ,Q).
However, when θ goes to∞, the probability mass will concen-
trate on some profiles. Such profiles are called stochastically
stable under ρ.
Stochastic stability can be asserted using the following
lemma, based on the orders (w.r.t. θ) of the transition proba-
bilities. When θ goes to∞, ε def= exp(−θ) goes to 0.
Let us express the transition probabilities as a function of ε
instead of θ:
Px,y =
∑
V⊇Diff(x,y)
ρx(V )
∏
k∈V
ε−uk(yk,x−k)∑
α∈A(k) ε−uk(α,x−k)
. (12)
which can be written under the following first order develop-
ment w.r.t. ε:
Px,y = cx,yε
qx,y + o(εqx,y ),
where qx,y is called the order of Px,y w.r.t. ε (or, equivalently,
w.r.t. θ).
Lemma 8 (Stochastic stability characterization [11]). State
x is stochastically stable if and only if the order of its minimal
in-tree is the smallest, among all in-trees.
Proof: This characterization has first been given in [11].
The following proof is similar to the original proof. It is helpful
to detail it here to further highlight the notion of orders, used in
the rest of the paper.
Using Equation (12), for any pair of states x and y, one can
compute the order qx,y as
qx,y =
min
V⊇Diff(x,y)∩S(ρ)
(∑
k∈V
(
max
α∈Ak
uk(α, x−k)− uk(yk, x−k)
))
.
(13)
Note that the orders of the transitions do not depend on the
values of ρ but only of its support. Therefore, the limit value
of pi only depends on S(ρ), as well. By using the Markov chain
tree theorem (Theorem 7), the order qx of pix w.r.t. ε is
qx
def
= min
T∈Tx
∑
(y,z)∈T
qy,z
Therefore, the only components in pi that do not go to 0
when ε goes to 0 are those with the smallest order:
( lim
θ→∞
pix > 0)⇔ (qx = min
y∈A
qy). (14)
Equation (13) provides an explicit formula of the order of
the transition probability from x to y. In particular, one may
observe that the order is always non-negative, and equal to zero
if and only if there is a revision set that only involves best
responses of the players in that set for going from x to y.
The next theorem states that the total probability mass of the
NEs goes to one when θ goes to∞. This implies that Algorithm
SmoothBRA(ρ,Q) will only visit NE with a high probability
when θ is large.
Theorem 9 (Convergence to NE). Let G be a BR-potential
game. If ρ is G-separable, then for all action profiles x that are
not NE, the stationary probability pix goes to 0 as θ goes to∞.
Proof: The proof is based on Lemma 8 that allows to
characterize the states with the smallest order. From the remark
following the lemma, qx,y is non-negative. It is equal to 0 if
and only if there is a set V in Diff(x, y) ∩ S(ρ) such that
y = BRV (x).
From Corollary 6, if ρ is G-separable, and starting from
any action profile x that is not a NE, there is a finite sequence
(Vn)06n<H of sets of players in S(ρ) and actions profiles
(Xn)06n6H such that
X0 = x
Xn+1 = BRVn(Xn), ∀ 0 6 n < H,
and XH is a NE. Using these sequences for all x constructs a
path whose order is 0, leading to the NE XH .
Let T ∗x be the tree with minimal order, routed in x. From
T ∗x , it is possible to construct a tree routed in XH by adding
the path from x to XH with order 0 and removing the arc in
T ∗x starting in XH . This arc has a strictly positive order because
XH is a NE. The new tree has an order strictly smaller that T ∗x ,
so x cannot achieve the minimum in (14). Therefore, only NE
may have positive stationary probabilities.
Using the same construction, one can show more generally
that any stochastically stable state is included in the recurrent
set of algorithm SmoothBRA(ρ,Q).
This result is to be compared with [11] where a similar result
is proved. It seems however that the absence of separability and
of Assumption 1 in [11] jeopardizes their result.
A stronger result can be proved for revisions that do not
allow for simultaneous revisions in the case of exact potential
games.
Theorem 10 (Convergence to optimal NE for asynchronous
revisions). Let G be a game with an exact potential F . If the
revision law does not contain any simultaneous play (in other
words, S(ρ) = {{k}, k ∈ N}) then the only stochastically
stable profiles are the optimal NE.
Proof: The proof of this result is a direct consequence of
the results in Chapter 12 of [12]. We provide a short proof
in the sake of completeness. First note that the stochastically
stable profiles do not depend on the actual values of ρ({k}), as
mentioned before. Let us consider the case where all of them are
equal: ρ({k}) = 1/N for all k ∈ N . In that uniform case, the
Markov chain (Xn) is reversible and the stationary probability
is explicitly known: for all profiles x, pix ∝ exp(θF (x)).
Therefore, when θ goes to ∞, the total stationary probability
of the profiles with optimal potential will go to one.
V. EXAMPLES
The following examples show that there is little hope to
prove more precise results, at least in the general case.
Example 4 shows that Theorem 9 is not true when the
revision protocol is not G-separable. This example shows a
game where SmoothBRA has stable non-NE points under a
non-separable protocol.
Example 5 shows that Theorem 10 is not true if all players
can play alone but simultanenous plays are also allowed. This
example has 3 players and it is easy to find examples with any
number of players larger than 3. However with two players,
Theorem 11 says that if both players can play alone then
simultaneous play will not jeopardize convergence to an optimal
NE. Example 6 shows that Theorem 11 is not true for all
separable protocols: if only one player among the two can play
alone, then convergence to the optimal NE is not garanteed.
Finally, Example 7 shows that Assumption 1 cannot be
relaxed in Theorem 9 by exhibiting a game with two players
(where both can play alone) that admits stable states that are not
NE.
Example 4 (No convergence to NE for a non-separable revi-
sion law). Let us consider a 2-player game with 2 actions each,
A := {a, b}. The support of the revision law is made of a single
set {1, 2} (both players always play together). This revision law
is not separable.
The payoffs of both players coincide with the potential,
given by the following matrix:
F =
1\2 a b
a 1 0.5
b 0 1
This game has two NE (a, a) and (b, b). The order of all the
transition probabilities are given in Figure 1, computed using
(13).
F = 0
0.5
0.5
1
0.50.5
1.5
0
1.5
1 1
10
(a, a)
(b, a)
(a, b)
(b, b)
F = 1 F = 0.5
F = 1
Figure 1. The orders of all the arcs in the transition graph of a 2-player
potential game, when the revision process always makes both players play
simultaneously
The minimal tree with root in (a, a), T ∗(a,a) can be computed
from Figure 1. Its order is q(a,a) = 1. The minimal tree with
root in (b, b), T ∗(b,b), can also be found from Figure 1, with order
q(b,b) = 1. The minimal trees for the profiles (a, b) and (b, a)
are both of order 1 as well: q(a,b) = 1 and q(b,b) = 1. Therefore,
the stochastically stable state of SmoothBRA(ρ,Q) are all the
states, (NE as well as non-NE). The algorithm will visit non-NE
states with probabilities that do not vanish when the parameter
θ becomes large. Actually, one can also compute the exact
stationary distribution for all θ: pi((a, a), (a, b), (b, a), (b, b)) is
proportional to:
(s4+s3+es2+es, s4+2s3+s2, s4+2es2+e2, s4+s3+es2+es),
where s def= eθ/2. Its limit when the parameter θ goes to infinity
is (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) so all states are uniformly selected re-
gardless of their potential. Even more surprisingly, notice that
when θ is larger than 2, the state with the largest probability is
(a, b), which is not a NE.
Example 5 (Convergence to non-optimal NE when players
can play alone). Let us consider a 3-player game N =
{x, y, z} with 2 actions each, A := {0, 1}. The support of the
revision law is the separable family {x}, {y}, {z}, {x, y, z}.
The payoffs of the players coincide with the potentials,
given by: F (0, 0, 0) = 3, F (1, 0, 0) = 0, F (0, 1, 0) = 1,
F (0, 0, 1) = 2, F (1, 1, 0) = −10, F (0, 1, 1) = −11,
F (1, 0, 1) = −12, F (1, 1, 1) = −1.
(2)
(1)
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
(−12)
(−11) (−1)
(−10)
(0)(3)
Figure 2. The minimal in-tree rooted in (0, 0, 0) has order q(0,0,0) = 9 (the
potentials are given in parenthesis and the orders of the transitions are in red).
This game has two NE (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1). The optimal
one, with maximal potential is (0, 0, 0). The minimal tree with
root in (0, 0, 0), T ∗(0,0,0), is of order q(0,0,0) = 9 (see Figure 2)
and does not use the revision set {x, y, z}.
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(1)0
0
0
0
0
0
(−12)
(−11) (−1)
(−10)
(0)(3)
(2)
Figure 3. The minimal in-tree rooted in (1, 1, 1) has order q(1,1,1) = 6
The minimal tree with root in (1, 1, 1), T ∗(1,1,1), is of order
q(1,1,1) = 6 (see Figure 3) and uses the revision set {x, y, z} to
jump from (0, 0, 0) to (1, 1, 1) with order 1+ 2+3 = 6, so it is
minimal.
Therefore, the only stochastically stable profile of
SmoothBRA(ρ,Q) will be (1, 1, 1), whose potential is
not optimal.
As mentioned before, convergence to optimal NE can be
proved in the case of two players who can play alone:
Theorem 11 (Convergence to optimal NE with two players).
Let G be a two-players game with exact potential F . If the
support of the revision process is {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} then the
only stochastically stable states are optimal NE.
Proof: We will first prove that there exists a tree with min-
imal order ending in each NE whose arcs only use singletons as
revision sets.
Let us notice that, from any state that is not a NE, there
is an outgoing arc of minimal order (0), that uses a unilateral
deviation. In the case where there are only two NE x∗ and y∗
(the general case being treated similarly by induction), the non-
NE states are all covered by two sets S1 and S2: those connected
to x∗ (resp. y∗) with paths of order 0 that involves single players
(some states may belong to both sets).
Now, to get the minimal tree rooted in x∗, only one path
is missing, from y∗ to one state in S1. Let us assume that this
path contains one diagonal arc (that involves two players), from
state u to state v. With no loss of generality, the next vertex after
v in this path, denoted w, shares the same action for player 1:
v1 = w1.
The order of the arc from u to v is F (u1,BR2(u1)) −
F (u1, v2) + F (BR1(u2), u2)− F (v1, u2), and the order of the
arc from v to w is F (v1,BR2(v1))− F (w).
Let us replace the path u → v → w by the path from u →
(v1, u2)→ w that does not contain any diagonal arc. The order
of the arc from u to (v1, u2) is F (BR1(u2), u2)−F (v1, u2), and
that of the arc from (v1, u2) to w is F (v1,BR2(v1)) − F (w).
Summing both values gives a path with smallest order.
As for node v, which is no longer on the path, it is in set S2,
so that it belongs to a path with order 0 to y∗. As for the order
for all other states, it is unchanged.
In total, the new tree has a smaller order as the previous one,
so that all diagonal arcs can be removed on the minimal tree.
Therefore, there exists a minimal tree rooted in x∗ that only
uses single revision sets. Now, Theorem 10 says that a minimal
tree with single revision sets rooted in an optimal NE has the
smallest order.
The condition on the revision process that all players can
play alone, used in Theorem 11, is stronger than separability.
Example 6 shows that separability is not enough to guarantee
convergence to optimal NE, even with two players.
Example 6 (Convergence to non-optimal NE for two separa-
ble players). Let us consider the following 2-player game with
respective actionsA1 = {a, b} andA2 = {a, b, c}. The support
of the revision law is {{2}, {1, 2}}, hence it is separable.
The payoffs of both players coincide with the potential,
given by the following matrix:
F =
1\2 a b c
a 11 0 5
b 5 10 8
This game has two NE (a, a) and (b, b). The minimal tree
with root in (a, a) has order 7. Indeed, the path with smallest
order to join (b, b) to (a, a) is (b, b)→ (b, c)→ (a, c)→ (a, a)
whose order is 2 + 5 + 0. All other states can be added to this
path with the order 0 thanks to unilateral best response of y. The
minimal tree with root in (b, b) has order 6. Indeed, the path with
the minimal order to join (a, a) to (b, b) is (a, a) → (b, a) →
(b, b) whose order is 6 + 0. All other states can be added to this
path with order 0 thanks to unilateral best response of y.
Finally, in the same scenario as in Theorem 11 (two players
and a revision process that contains both singletons), even worse
things can occur when NE are not strict. Non strict NE can only
exist when the best response is not unique. This possibility has
been discarded up to now in this paper (Assumption 1). In the
next example, we consider a case where the NE are not strict so
that Assumption 1 is violated.
Example 7 (No convergence to NE with two separable play-
ers if NE are not strict). Consider a separable revision process,
where both players can play alone, with support {1}, {2} and
{1, 2} and a game with two actions per player given by the
potentials (payoffs are equal to potentials):
F =
1\2 a b
a 1 1
b 1 0
States (a, a), (a, b), (b, a) are non-strict NE and all states
(including (b, b)) have a minimal in-tree of order 0, so even
when the temperature 1/θ goes to 0, the non-NE state (b, b)
has a non-vanishing probability of being chosen. More pre-
cisely, by computing the exact stationary distribution pi for
all temperatures, one can check that when θ goes to infinity,
pi((a, a), (a, b), (b, a), (b, b)) → (36/79, 20/79, 20/79, 3/79)
if the revision sets {1}, {2} and {1, 2} are chosen uniformly.
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